{"id":585,"date":"2020-05-16T13:20:24","date_gmt":"2020-05-16T19:20:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585"},"modified":"2020-05-16T13:20:24","modified_gmt":"2020-05-16T19:20:24","slug":"the-shake-n-bake-nco","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585","title":{"rendered":"The Shake ‘n’ Bake NCO"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

The Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course (NCOCC)<\/h1>\n

At the time of my initial 1999 research in to
\nthe Skill Development Base Program in 1999
\nlittle had been written on the story of not only
\nthis revolutionary new way to develop
\nsergeants for combat, but the men who were
\nchosen for training for that singular purpose.
\nSince that time there were at least 3 books
\nwritten, including my monograph Educating
\nNoncommissioned Officers (of which this is
\nbased on), yet the stories continue to be told.
\nEven among the attendees or the soldiers of
\nthat period, little is known beyond anecdotes,
\nrumors or lore.
\n-CSM (Ret.) Dan Elder, Curator<\/em><\/p>\n

\"NCOC
NCO School insignia<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Download the document here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Prologue – Studying the Effects
\nof NCO Training<\/h2>\n

In 1957 the U.S. Continental Army Command
\n(CONARC) and the U.S. Army Leadership
\nHuman Research Unit (with support from the
\nGeorge Washington University) began to
\nstudy the feasibility of identifying and
\ntraining enlisted soldiers in the event of
\nhostilities to perform in leadership roles.
\nLong-recognized that the NCO was important
\nto the smooth operation of the Army, there
\nhad been relatively little research conducted
\non improving their training. Task NCO was
\nthus born, with the goal of determining how
\nto identify and train enlisted soldiers as
\nNCOs. Parallel research programs were
\nbegun, with the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) of George Washington
\nUniversity developing initial psychological
\npredictors of leadership potential and the
\nevaluation system for use in identifying
\ncompetent leaders for senior NCO positions.
\nThe U.S. Army Personnel Research Office
\n(USAPRO) had the mission of developing
\ntechniques to identify early in the careers of
\nthose enlisted men who were capable of
\nbecoming good noncommissioned officers in
\nthe combat branches.<\/p>\n

The Army Noncommissioned Officer’s
\nAcademy system was selected to serve as the
\nframework to measure leadership
\nperformance. The commander of the U.S.
\nConstabulary force in Europe Maj. Gen. Isaac
\nD. White decided late in 1949 that special
\ntraining was needed for the noncommissioned
\nofficers of the Constabulary. He turned to the
\ncommander of the 2nd Constabulary Brigade
\nBrig. Gen Bruce C. Clarke, who expressed his
\nenthusiasm about the project. White gave him
\nthe mission of organizing a
\nNoncommissioned Officer Academy in
\nunused buildings at Jensen Barracks in
\nMunich, of which he was to also serve as the
\nAcademy’s Commandant. White explained
\nwhat he wanted of the curriculum and stated
\nit would be run on a strict military basis. It
\nwas to be purely academic classroom
\ninstruction, not hands-on training. Clarke set
\nup a six weeks course with White’s approval,
\nand in September 1949 the Constabulary
\nNoncommissioned Officer Academy was
\nestablished. In later years, Clarke would
\nconsider the NCO Academy to be one of the
\nmost successful activities he had been
\ncharged with in his illustrious career.<\/p>\n

Initially, the HumRRO project was to study the effects of academy training on
\nnoncommissioned officers job performance
\nand to study the factors that modify effects of
\nacademy training. But at the urging of the
\nCONARC Human Research Advisory
\nCommittee, HumRRO ultimately settled on a
\nthree-phase study. According to CONARC
\nthey believed that in a future mobilization that
\n\u201cthe need for enlisted leaders would far
\nexceed the number available from both the
\nactive Army,\u201d and that the need for NCOs so
\npressing that they might be required to
\n\u201cappoint leaders before their ability could
\nactually be proved on the battlefield.\u201d One of
\nthe early results of the study was the
\npublishing of the USCONARC Pamphlet
\n350-24, Guide for the Potential
\nNoncommissioned Officer, which was a howto guide for candidates to smooth the
\ntransition for enlisted soldiers from within the
\nranks to a sergeant.<\/p>\n

In June 1961 Russia demanded the
\nwithdrawal of western forces from the
\nGerman capital of Berlin and then started
\nconstructing a wall to divide the city. In the
\nmidst of those studies and field experiments
\nthe Army and the Department of Defense was
\nfaced with a possible call for mobilization as
\na result of the Berlin Crisis. HumRRO
\nsuggested that a two-week Leader Preparation
\nCourse (LPC) between Basic and Advanced
\ntraining be instituted. The goals were to
\nprovide support to the training cadre at
\nadvanced training sites and centers, and
\nprovide these leader trainees with supervisory
\nand human relations skills. In October, the
\nLeader Preparation Program (LPP) was
\nimplemented at Forts Dix, Knox, Gordon,
\nJackson, Carson, and Ord. In 1963 a oneweek Leader Orientation Course was provided to the Women’s Army Corps, to be
\nconducted one-week before basic training.
\nThe LPP was based on a four- week LPC and
\nconsisted of training programs and
\nobservations. As to be expected for a program
\nof this type, there was resistance from the
\n“old soldiers.” The researchers noted that at
\neach training center they had to contact and
\npersuade approximately 30 officers and 100
\nNCOs to adjust their procedures, and to
\nconvince them the system would work.<\/p>\n

A series of pilot studies was conducted to
\nexamine the problems of junior NCO
\nselection, prediction and evaluation of new
\nrecruits. Informal leadership training was
\nconducted using different approaches and
\ntechniques, and by the completion of the
\nstudy three experimental training systems
\nwere developed. The 1967 conclusions drawn
\nup at the close of the10-year study were that:<\/p>\n

Leadership Selection.<\/strong> The candidate
\nfor leadership training should be above
\naverage on BCT (basic training) Peer
\nRatings and on the appropriate
\nAptitude Area score. Supervisors’
\nevaluations should be used to eliminate
\nmen who are obvious misfits or to
\nrecommend men who are outstanding
\nprospects in the opinions of the cadre
\ndespite poor aptitude scores or low
\nPeer Ratings.<\/p>\n

Leadership Training.<\/strong> The
\nexperimental training methods led to
\nbetter leadership indications on nearly
\nall criteria, with the Leader Preparation
\nCourse system exhibiting greatest
\neffectiveness and feasibility among
\nvarious experimental and control
\nconditions tested.<\/p>\n

Training Method.<\/strong> Relatively little
\ncriterion difference was found between
\nresults from specific training methods
\n(i.e., functional context versus
\ntraditional; high cost versus low cost).
\nHowever, because the time involved in
\npresentation of each different method
\nvaried, definitive comparisons could
\nnot be made.<\/p>\n

The CONARC-sponsored Unit NCO project
\nwas directly influential on important changes
\nto the way the Army trained initial entry
\nsoldiers. In 1963, Stephen Ailes, then
\nSecretary of the Army, made a
\ncomprehensive survey of recruit training in
\nthe Army. The Ailes Report recommended
\nestablishment of schools that would offer
\nformal instruction to trainers newly assigned
\nto duty at Army Training Centers. The project
\nwas organized at Fort Jackson during the
\nperiod 1 February-17 April 1964. CONARC
\ndeveloped a new concept to transfer
\nresponsibility from training committees to the
\nplatoon sergeant. Technical advisory in the
\ndevelopment of the “Drill Sergeant” was
\nprovided by the Work Unit and the LPP
\nserved as the model for the Drill Sergeant
\nProgram and in developing the Drill Sergeant
\nCourse, first conducted at Fort Jackson.<\/p>\n

The Noncommissioned Officer’s
\nCandidate Course<\/h2>\n

As the war in Vietnam had progressed, the attrition of combat, the 12-month tour limit in<\/span>
\nVietnam, separations of senior
\nnoncommissioned officers and the 25-month
\nstateside stabilization policy began to take its
\ntoll on the ranks of enlisted leaders to the
\npoint of crisis. Without a call up of the
\nreserve forces, Vietnam became the Regular
\nArmy’s war, fought by junior leaders. The
\nArmy was faced with sending career noncoms
\nback into action sooner or filling the ranks
\nwith the most senior PFC or specialist. Field
\ncommanders were challenged with
\nunderstaffed vacancies at base camps, filling
\nvarious key leadership positions, and
\nproviding for replacements. Older and more
\nexperienced NCOs, some World War II
\nveterans, were strained by the physical
\nrequirements of the methods of jungle
\nfighting. The Army was quickly running out
\nof noncommissioned officers in the combat
\nspecialties.<\/p>\n

In order to meet these unprecedented
\nrequirements for NCO leaders the Army
\ndeveloped a solution called Skilled
\nDevelopment Base (SDB) Program on the
\nproven Officer Candidate Course where an
\nenlisted man could attend basic and advanced
\ntraining, and if recommended or applied for,
\nfilled out an application and attended OCS.
\nThe thought by some was that the same could
\nbe done for noncoms. If a carefully selected
\nsoldier can be given 23 weeks of intensive
\ntraining that would qualify him to lead a
\nplatoon, then others can be trained to lead
\nsquads and fire teams in the same amount of
\ntime. From this seed the Noncommissioned
\nOfficers Candidate Course (NCOC) was born.
\nPotential candidates were selected from
\ngroups of initial entry soldiers who had a
\nsecurity clearance of confidential, an infantry score of 100 or over and demonstrated
\nleadership potential. Based on
\nrecommendations, the unit commander would
\nselect potential NCOs, but all were not
\nvolunteers. Those selected to attend NCOC
\nwere immediately made corporals and later
\npromoted to sergeant upon graduation from
\nphase one. The select few who graduated with
\nhonors would be promoted to staff sergeant.
\nThe outstanding graduate of the first class,
\nStaff Sgt. Melvin C. Leverick, recalled “I
\nthink that those who graduated [from the
\nNCOC] were much better prepared for some
\nof the problems that would arise in Vietnam.”<\/p>\n

The NCO candidate course was designed to
\nmaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted
\ndraftee. The Army Chief of Staff Gen. Harold
\nK. Johnson approved the concept on June 22,
\n1967, and on September 5 the first course at
\nFort Benning, GA began with Sgt. Maj. Don
\nWright serving as the first NCOC
\nCommandant. By combining the amount of
\ntime it took to attend basic and advanced
\ntraining, including leave and travel time, and
\nthen add a 12-month tour in Vietnam, the
\ndevelopers settled on a 21-22 week course.
\nNCOC was divided into two phases. Phase I
\nwas 12 weeks of intensive, hands-on training,
\nbroken down into three basic phases. For the
\nInfantry noncom, the course included tasks
\nsuch as physical training, hand-to-hand
\ncombat, weapons, first aid, map reading,
\ncommunications, and indirect fire. Vietnam
\nveterans or Rangers taught many of the
\nclasses, but the cadre of the first course was
\ncommissioned officers. The second basic
\nphase focused on instruction of fire team,
\nsquad and platoon tactics. Though over 300
\nhours of instruction was given, 80-percent
\nwas conducted in the field. The final basic phase was a “dress rehearsal for Vietnam,” a
\nfull week of patrols, ambush, defensive
\nperimeters, and navigation. Twice daily the
\nVietnam-schooled Rangers critiqued the
\ncandidates and all training was conducted
\ntactically.<\/p>\n

Throughout the 12-weeks of training,
\nleadership was instilled in all that the students
\nwould do. A student chain of command was
\nset up and “Tactical NCOs” supervised the
\ndaily performance of the candidates. By the
\ntime the students successfully completed
\nPhase I, they were promoted to sergeant or
\nstaff sergeant, and shipped off to conduct a 9-
\n10 week practical application of their
\nleadership skills by serving as assistant
\nleaders in a training center or unit. This gave
\nthe candidate the opportunity to gain more
\nconfidence in leading soldiers. As with many
\nprograms of its time, NCOC was originally
\ndeveloped to meet the needs of the combat
\narms. With the success of the course, it was
\nextended to other career fields, and the
\nprogram became known as the Skill
\nDevelopment Base Program. The Armored
\nSchool began NCOC on December 5, 1967.
\nSome schools later offered a correspondence
\n“preparatory course” for those who
\nanticipated attending NCOC or had not
\nbenefited from such formal military
\nschooling.<\/p>\n

As with the Leadership Preparation Course
\ntested by HumRRO, the “regular” noncoms
\nand soldiers had much resentment for the
\nNCOC graduates, as those who took 4-6 years
\nto earn their stripes the hard way, were
\nimmediately angered. Old-time sergeants
\nbegan to use terms like “Shake ‘n’ Bake,”
\nInstant NCO,” or “Whip-n-Chills” to identify this new type on noncom. Many complained
\nby voice or in writing that it took years to
\nbuild a noncommissioned officer and that the
\nprogram was wrong. Many feared it would
\naffect their promotion opportunities, and one
\nsenior NCO worried that “nobody had shown
\nthem [NCOC graduates] how to keep floor
\nbuffers operational in garrison.” William O.
\nWooldridge, serving as the recently
\nestablished position of Sergeant Major of the
\nArmy stated that, “promotions given to men
\nwho complete the course will not directly
\naffect the promotion possibilities of other
\ndeserving soldiers in Vietnam or other parts
\nof the world.” In his speech to the first
\ngraduating class Wooldridge said that, “Great
\nthings are expected from you. Besides being
\nthe first class, you are also the first group who
\nhas ever been trained this way. It has been a
\nwhole new idea in training.” As Wooldridge
\nexpressed, all were not suspicious of this new
\nway to train NCOs. After initial skepticism,
\noutgoing battalion commander of 2d Bn, 27th
\nInfantry Lt. Col. Winfried. G. Skelton was
\nasked how he though NCO Candidate Course
\ngraduates performed in combat, to which he
\nreplied, “within a short time they [NCOC
\ngraduates] proved themselves completely and
\nwe were crying for more. Because of their
\ntraining, they repeatedly surpassed the soldier
\nwho had risen from the ranks in combat and
\nprovided the quality of leadership at the squad
\nand platoon level which is essential in the
\ntype of fighting we are doing.”<\/p>\n

The graduates recognized the value of their
\ntraining. Young draftees attending initial
\ntraining at the time knew they were destined
\nfor Vietnam. Many potential candidates were
\neligible for Officer Candidate School, but
\nrejected it because they would incur an additional service obligation. They realized
\nthat NCOC was a method by which they
\ncould expand on their military training before
\nentering the war. Some were exposed to the
\nPhase II NCO Candidates serving as TAC
\nNCOs during their initial training and felt
\nthey could do the same. Many graduates
\nwould later say that the NCO Candidate
\nCourse, taught by Vietnam veterans who
\nexperienced the war first hand, was what kept
\nthem and their soldiers alive and its lessons
\nwould go on to serve them well later in life.
\nMany were assigned as assistant fire team
\nleaders upon arrival in Vietnam and then
\nrapidly advanced to squad or platoon
\nsergeants. Most would not see their fellow
\nclassmates again, and in many cases were the
\nsenior (or only) NCO in the platoon. Some
\nwould go on to make a career of the military
\nor later attend OCS, and four were Medal of
\nHonor winners. In the end over 26,000
\nsoldiers were graduates of one of the NCO
\nCandidate Courses.<\/p>\n

The NCOC graduate had a specific role in the
\nArmy-they were trained to do one thing in
\none branch in one place in the world, and that
\nwas to be a fire team leader in Vietnam. It
\nwas recognized that they were not taught how
\nto teach drill and ceremonies, inspect a
\nbarracks, or how to conduct police call. Many
\nrated the program by how the graduates
\nperformed in garrison, for which they had
\nlittle skill. But their performance in the rice
\npaddies and jungles as combat leaders was
\nwhere they took their final tests, of which
\nmany receiving the ultimate failing grade. But
\neducating NCOs and potential NCOs was
\nfirmly in place for the Army.<\/p>\n

Epilouge<\/h2>\n

The call was out in the Army to educate
\nnoncommissioned officers. In 1963 a council
\nof senior NCOs at Fort Dix called for a senior
\nNCO college, and one of the main topics was
\nNCO education in November 1966 during
\nSMA Wooldridge’s first Command Sergeants
\nMajor Conference. The Army began to look
\nat educating noncoms in earnest. On August
\n17, 1965, the Chief of Staff of the Army
\ndirected a comprehensive Enlisted Grade
\nStructure Study. This study, which was
\ncompleted in July 1967, focused on how to
\nestablish and manage a quality-based enlisted
\nforce, and dedicated a portion for “improving
\nthe vital area of training.” In response, the
\nDeputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
\ndeveloped a comprehensive 5-year plan to
\nmanage career enlisted soldiers which
\nincluded many far reaching programs, such as
\ncareer management fields, MOS
\nreclassification, the Qualitative Management
\nProgram, and Force Renewal through NCO
\nEducational Development.<\/p>\n

The Project recommended formal leadership
\ntraining designed to prepare selected careerenlisted personnel for progressive levels of
\nduty, and noted it would enhance career
\nattractiveness and the quality of the
\nnoncommissioned officer. This study
\nrecognized that “The present haphazard
\nsystem of career development, as opposed to
\nskill development, had two bad results. First, the image of the NCO as a professional,
\nhighly trained individual is difficult to foster;
\nsecond, the Army’s resource of intelligent
\nenlisted men, anxious to develop as career
\nsoldiers, is inefficiently managed. The Army
\nhas extended great effort to ensure the
\nselected development of its officers.
\nAnalagous [sic] effort should be spent in the
\ndevelopment of the noncommissioned
\nofficers of the Army.”<\/p>\n

The report went on to recommend a threelevel educational program, similar to officers,
\noutlined in the February 1969 NCO
\nEducational Development Concept. The first
\nof the three levels consisted of the Basic
\nCourse which was designated to produce the
\nbasic E-5 NCO. The Advanced Course was
\ntargeted to mid-grade NCOs, and the Senior
\nCourse was envisioned as a management
\ncourse directed to qualifying men for senior
\nenlisted staff positions. The Skill
\nDevelopment Base Program, NCOC, was
\nselected to serve as the model for the Basic
\nCourse. Project Proficiency, to be now known
\nas the NCO Education System (NCOES), was
\nto become a reality.<\/p>\n

On the 23rd of April 1970, President Richard
\nNixon announced to Congress that a new
\nnational objective would be set to establish an
\nall-volunteer force and from that the Modern
\nVolunteer Army was born. But by mid-1971
\nArmy Chief of Staff General William
\nWestmoreland was unhappy with the progress
\nof the MVA and asked then retired Bruce
\nClarke to travel the Army and find out what
\ncould be changed to make it more attractive.
\nOn a visit to Fort Hood, Clarke arrived in
\ntime for its NCO Academy to close its doors,
\na repeat of the same story at other installations. Clarke conducted a survey and
\ndiscovered that there were only four NCO
\nAcademies remaining in which to train
\n100,000 noncommissioned officers. In his
\nreport back to Westmoreland, Clarke
\nlamented that “we are running an army with
\n95% of the NCO’s untrained!” NCO
\nacademies across the nation were reopened,
\nand Westmoreland approved the Basic and
\nAdvance noncommissioned officer courses,
\nand by July the first Basic course pilot began.<\/p>\n

Some of the difficulties facing the Army of
\n1971 included Westmoreland’s concern for
\nleadership inadequacies. He directed the
\nCONARC Commander to form a study on
\nleadership, and noted “the evident need for
\nimmediate attention by the chain of command
\nto improving our leadership techniques to
\nmeet the Army’s current challenges.” He also
\ndirected the War College in Carlisle,
\nPennsylvania to determine the type of
\nleadership that would be appropriate as the
\nArmy approached the end of the draft. While
\nthese studies were going on, the Army was
\ncontinually under fire. The May 1971 release
\nof Comptroller General’s Report to Congress
\non the Improper Use of Enlisted Personnel
\nnoted that the Secretary of the Army should
\nstrengthen existing policies rather than
\nintroduce new programs or changes. That
\nsame month Westmoreland urged all the
\ncommanders of the major commands to grant
\ntheir noncommissioned officers broader
\nauthority. In his list of 14 points he asked
\nthem to “expand NCOs education through
\nwise counseling and by affording them the
\nopportunity to attend NCO Academies, NCO
\nrefresher courses, and off-duty educational
\nprograms.”<\/p>\n

NCOC seeds Army NCO
\nEducation System<\/h2>\n

Planning for the development of an education
\nsystem for enlisted leaders of the Modern
\nVolunteer Army began in early 1969.
\nObviously, if the NCO could be schooltrained for the jungle, then they ought to be
\nschool-trained for the garrison, too.
\nWestmoreland had intended to establish a
\nsenior NCO school in 1968, but CONARC
\ncommander Gen. James K. Woolnough was
\nnot enthusiastic about the plan. Woolnough
\nbelieved that senior NCOs, like generals,
\nneeded no further military schooling. This
\nwas the same problem Gen. Johnson was
\nearlier faced with while trying to establish the
\nNCO Candidate Course when CONARC
\ncommander Gen. Paul A. Freeman and his
\nheadquarters would not accept the idea.
\nJohnson opted to wait until Woolnough
\nassumed command of CONARC to begin the
\nNCO candidate program. Westmoreland
\nwould also wait until Gen. Ralph E. Haines
\nJr. succeeded Woolnough at CONARC for
\nthe senior NCO school.<\/p>\n

In July of 1970, during a lull in the NCO
\nCandidate classes at Fort Sill, they conducted
\nthe first pilot of the Noncommissioned
\nOfficer Basic Course. The NCO Education
\nProgram could only begin when NCOC
\nCandidate Courses were completed because
\nof scarce resources\u2026and the first of the
\nArmy-wide courses began in May 1971. In January of 1972 the first two
\nNoncommissioned Officer Advance Courses
\nbegan and that same year Chief of Staff Gen.
\nCreighton Abrams approved the
\nestablishment of the Senior NCO Course, to
\nbe located at the newly established Sergeants
\nMajor Academy at an unused airfield in El
\nPaso, Texas. The draft ended on December
\n31, 1972 and the Army entered 1973 prepared
\nto rely on volunteers.<\/p>\n

The three-tiered noncommissioned officer
\neducation system was initially developed for
\ncareer soldiers, specifically for those who had
\nre-enlisted at least once. Students would
\nattend the courses in a temporary duty status,
\nwith the sergeants major course being a
\npermanent change of station. NCOES was
\nestablished in late 1971 and phased in across
\nthe Army. Funding was a problem,
\nparticularly with overseas soldiers and by
\nDecember 1971 CONARC had to cancel 9 of
\n12 Basic Course classes because of poor
\nattendance. CONARC convened a NCOES
\nconference in October and implemented
\nincentives including promoting the top
\ngraduates, offering promotion points to
\ngraduates and mandatory quotas by
\nCONARC. Reserve soldiers were authorized
\nto attend active courses, and different
\nbranches developed correspondence courses.<\/p>\n

In January 1972 the first two advance courses
\nstarted, consisting only of E-7s because the
\nDepartment of the Army did not maintain the
\nfiles of E-6s to screen. By 1974, forty-two
\ncourses had been established through
\nCONARC, and in August U.S. Army Europe
\npersonnel were allowed to attend advance
\ncourses in the United States.<\/p>\n

Dedicated to:<\/h2>\n
    \n
  • SSG Robert J. Pruden, Class 2-69<\/li>\n
  • SSG Hammett Lee Bowen, Jr., Class 4-69<\/li>\n
  • SSG Robert C. Murray, Class 38-69<\/li>\n
  • SGT Lester R. Stone, Jr. Class 37-68<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The NCO candidate course was designed to
    \nmaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted
    \ndraftee<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":586,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[20],"class_list":["post-585","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-education","tag-ncocc"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"NCO Historical Society\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/tbs.tx\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1104\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"537\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Daniel Elder\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@milmediagroup\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@milmediagroup\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Daniel Elder\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"18 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Daniel Elder\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2\"},\"headline\":\"The Shake ‘n’ Bake NCO\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585\"},\"wordCount\":3650,\"commentCount\":1,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/05\\\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"NCOCC\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Education\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585\",\"name\":\"The Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/05\\\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2\"},\"description\":\"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/05\\\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2020\\\/05\\\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg\",\"width\":1104,\"height\":537,\"caption\":\"NCO School\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?p=585#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Shake ‘n’ Bake NCO\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/\",\"name\":\"NCO Historical Society\",\"description\":\"Writing the History of the United States Army Noncommissioned Officer\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2\",\"name\":\"Daniel Elder\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Daniel Elder\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\\\/\\\/danelder.com\"]}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society","description":"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society","og_description":"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee","og_url":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585","og_site_name":"NCO Historical Society","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/tbs.tx","article_published_time":"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1104,"height":537,"url":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Daniel Elder","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@milmediagroup","twitter_site":"@milmediagroup","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Daniel Elder","Est. reading time":"18 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585"},"author":{"name":"Daniel Elder","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/#\/schema\/person\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2"},"headline":"The Shake ‘n’ Bake NCO","datePublished":"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585"},"wordCount":3650,"commentCount":1,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg","keywords":["NCOCC"],"articleSection":["Education"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585","url":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585","name":"The Shake 'n' Bake NCO - NCO Historical Society","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg","datePublished":"2020-05-16T19:20:24+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/#\/schema\/person\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2"},"description":"The NCO candidate course was designed tomaximize the two-year tour of the enlisted draftee","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/NCOC_Book_cover.jpg","width":1104,"height":537,"caption":"NCO School"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?p=585#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Shake ‘n’ Bake NCO"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/#website","url":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/","name":"NCO Historical Society","description":"Writing the History of the United States Army Noncommissioned Officer","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/#\/schema\/person\/164281841f910e15389345dd217658d2","name":"Daniel Elder","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/b6677ca557162c8ac75cf4a894db6873e01d092bf74a06fdbe17c3d0db91dcba?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Daniel Elder"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/danelder.com"]}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=585"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":588,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/585\/revisions\/588"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/586"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=585"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=585"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ncohistoricalsociety.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=585"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}